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Distributive sufficiency, inequality-blindness and 
disrespectful treatment
Vincent Harting
Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 
London, UK
ABSTRACT
Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulner-
able to the ‘blindness to inequality and other values objection’. This objection 
targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of 
justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently 
sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This 
paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, 
I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes 
from relational, and not distributive, inequalities, different strategies are open for 
sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent 
literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, 
and the possibility of reducing one to the other, strategies of ‘internalizing’ and 
‘externalizing’ relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian 
framework are explored. In turn, I suggest that both strategies fail in their 
standard versions, but argue that a particular ‘hybrid view’ about justice is an 
attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist.
KEYWORDS Distributive sufficiency; inequality-blindness; relational egalitarianism; internalizing and 
externalizing strategies; hybrid theories of justice
Introduction
Sufficientarian theories argue that requirements of distributive justice are 
fulfilled when everyone has enough – i.e. when there is an outcome in 
which all relevant agents have met an especially important threshold of 
advantage. Varieties of distributive sufficientarianism differ in many aspects, 
but all entail that additional requirements of justice are irrelevant above the 
favoured threshold – what Paula Casal have called the negative thesis (Casal, 
2007, p. 299). This thesis has been attacked on grounds that it allows inequal-
ities that intuitively have significant moral relevance for justice – e.g. disre-
spectful treatment (Ibid. p. 307) – giving rise to the blindness to inequality and 
other important values objection – henceforth ‘BIO’. The aim of this paper is to 
explore plausible and general ways in which the sufficiency view could 
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respond to BIO. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of BIO 
comes from relational and not distributive inequalities, different strategies are 
open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing 
on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational 
egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other (Cordelli, 2015; 
Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018; Gheaus, 2016; Moles & Parr, 2019), I will canvass 
the strategies of internalizing and externalizing relational egalitarian con-
cerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework, and suggest that both 
strategies fail in their standard versions. But I will also argue that a hybrid 
view that endorses a particular form of distributive sufficiency, which inter-
nalizes some relational aspects, but accepts that others are non-reducible, is 
an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist. In this way, while most 
hybrid conceptions so far have been distributive-egalitarian, I argue that 
sufficientarians can keep relational egalitarian intuitions while remaining 
distributively non-egalitarian.
Section 1 depicts the main characteristics of the generic sufficiency view and 
its sensitivity to BIO. I also introduce some relational egalitarian concerns and 
suggest that sufficientarians can, in principle, accommodate them. Section 2 
explores two different ways of responding to BIO. Section 3 concludes by arguing 
that sufficientarians could solve the problem by endorsing a specific hybrid of 
distributive sufficientarianism and relational egalitarianism.
The sufficiency view and the blindness to inequality objection
Sufficientarian theorists are generally committed to holding the generic suffi-
ciency view (GSV), according to which
(GSV) Distributive justice is fulfilled when absolute deficiencies are eliminated 
regardless of whether inequalities persist beyond that point. (Nielsen, 2019, p. 22)
As already pointed out, sufficientarian theories hold that there exists (at 
least) one privileged threshold of advantage that it is especially important for 
people to meet, meaning that we should look for an outcome where everyone 
has enough. In this sense, justice is concerned with eliminating absolute 
deficiencies, rather than focusing on relative shares (Nielsen, 2019, p. 23). As 
such, the truth of the GSV is said to entail two theses that stand in need of 
justification: the positive thesis (PT), which ‘ . . . stresses the importance of 
people living above a certain threshold, free from deprivation’, and the 
negative thesis (NT), which ‘ . . . denies the relevance of certain additional 
distributive requirements’ above it (Casal, 2007, pp. 297–298). While holding 
PT is quite uncontroversial, I will stick to the idea that what makes sufficien-
tarianism a distinctive view is its full endorsement of NT (Schemmel, 2011b, 
p. 369; Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015, p. 407, 2017, p. 111; Nielsen, 2019, p. 22).1 So, 
why should we endorse it? Roughly, sufficientarians ground its intuitive 
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plausibility by appealing to the idea that what really matters for justice is to 
correct states of affairs in which people lack access to certain important 
things in virtue of which they might be under bad conditions, while claiming 
the moral irrelevance of redistributive measures once people are positioned in 
high levels of advantage. The latter concern has been famously exemplified 
by Crisp (2003, p. 775) and Benbaji (2005, p. 315) in their respective Beverly 
Hills and Bill Gates and Warren Buffet thought experiments, which suggest the 
moral irrelevance of comparative criteria when evaluating distributions 
between the rich and the super-rich. But sufficientarians tend to argue, also, 
that focusing in absolute deficiencies gives us a further theoretical leverage: it 
allows us to address actual injustices more directly. For what happens above 
the relevant threshold(s) constitutes a domain that really should not ‘ . . . 
deserve the attention of political philosophers’ (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2017, 
p. 111), and so the sufficiency view could offer us a theory that is better 
suited to address the circumstances of dire deprivation and misery that our 
world actually suffers.
While these reasons are surely not enough for persuading everyone about the 
truth of distributive sufficientarianism, assume that you are preliminarily con-
vinced by them. But consider now the following paradigmatic version of BIO:
Hospital. There is a hospital in which every patient has been provided with 
enough medicine, food, comfort, and alike. The hospital receives a fantastic 
donation, which includes spare rooms for visitors, delicious meals, and the best 
in world cinema. The administrators, then, arbitrarily decide to devote all those 
luxuries to just a few fortunate beneficiaries. This decision is intuitively wrong. 
But the GSV does nothing to prove otherwise: it suggests that once everyone 
has enough, it does not matter how unequally additional resources are dis-
tributed. (Casal, 2007, p. 307)
Hospital pumps the intuition that we should care about inequality despite 
the fact that people have ‘enough’, and hence reject NT – which, as stated 
above, is a necessary condition for holding the GSV. Because, if we accept 
Casal’s description of the patients as being above the relevant threshold, and 
explain the wrongness of Hospital as a distributive failure – e.g. because some 
have more benefits than others tout court –, we are forced to deny NT and 
refute the sufficiency view. Put differently, inasmuch as comparative criteria 
are irrelevant above the threshold, it seems that distributive sufficientarian-
ism would be unable to tell us what is wrong with cases of this kind.
I want to propose a way out of this problem. While endorsing NT does entail 
ruling out the applicability of comparative criteria of distribution in high levels 
of advantage, perhaps what grounds the wrong of Hospital is not some mal-
distribution of divisible goods in the first place. Rather, it is intuitively plausible 
to argue that what makes Hospital morally worrisome is that, although ex 
hypothesi patients have enough resources to lead decent lives, it displays 
a situation in which dimensions referring to social relations, regarding how 
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people mutually treat each other, are wronged. In other words, even granting 
that the unequal distribution of resources is irrelevant for the sufficientarian, 
there is still normative space for claiming that the way in which administrators 
distribute fails to treat their patients with proper respect – e.g. expressing 
contempt, neglect, or exercising dominating power by arbitrarily interfering 
with their choices without tracking their interests – and that this is the wrong 
that we have to account for. In this sense, I interpret Hospital as challenging 
sufficientarians to incorporate relational egalitarian considerations into their 
normative framework – namely, the idea that equality should be understood 
as a social relationship free from domination, oppression, or discrimination, and 
not a distributional pattern (Anderson, 1999; Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018; 
Fourie, 2012; Scheffler, 2005; Schemmel, 2011a). Sufficientarians can deny the 
intrinsic distributive importance of equality and still claim its relational relevance 
for justice, explaining why this version of BIO is morally problematic while 
keeping its commitment to NT thereof. Drawing on the recent debate about 
the possibility of reducing relational egalitarianism to distributive egalitarian-
ism – or vice versa – (Moles & Parr, 2019), the next section explores two 
strategies for incorporating relational concerns into the sufficientarian frame-
work (Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018). The first is to object to the outcome of 
Hospital by internalizing relational issues and claim that unequal distributions 
and disrespectful relations matter insofar as they affect individuals’ absolute 
levels of advantage. The second is to externalize these concerns by saying that 
relational inequalities cannot be reduced to distributive considerations, but that 
objecting to them is nevertheless compatible with the sufficiency view.
Internalizing and externalizing egalitarian relations
The internalizing strategy
The attempt to reduce relational concerns to distributions has been explored 
recently by egalitarians through the claim that certain relations make a non- 
substitutable contribution to the metrics that justice should equalize (e.g. 
Cordelli, 2015; Gheaus, 2016). Translated to sufficientarian language, the 
internalizing strategy makes the following claim:
Justice can be defined as and reduced to distributive sufficiency. Other values, 
such as equal social relations and community, can be re-described to fit within 
this framework. (Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018, p. 3)
Axelsen and Nielsen’s conception of sufficiency as freedom from duress 
(Duress) is probably the most elaborated theory available akin to this strategy 
(Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015, 2017). In what follows I will use therefore it as a basis 
for exploring its justificatory potential.
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Axelsen and Nielsen argue for a currency-pluralist and objective sufficiency 
view, according to which individuals are said to have enough when they are 
free from duress, that is, ‘ . . . from significant pressure against succeeding in 
central aspects of human life’ (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015, p. 406). What is 
distinctive of Duress is that justice should be delimited to a concern with 
central aspects of human life necessary to flourish (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2017, 
p. 113), but also that these different aspects are equally important and have 
different internal distributive logics. More precisely, they argue that every 
account of human flourishing must include aspects related to the satisfaction 
of biological and physical human needs, the fundamental interests of a human 
agent, and fundamental interests of human beings in a social setting – namely, 
aspects related to ‘ . . . pursuing one’s valuable ends within a community, 
including the freedom to vote, to associate, and the absence from discrimina-
tion and oppression’ (Idem). Now, importantly, they claim that some of these 
dimensions have positional aspects, as their absolute value might be affected 
by virtue of their unequal distribution (Brighouse & Swift, 2006, p. 472). In 
other words, sometimes we should care about relative shares because having 
less than others entails absolute deficiencies (Nielsen, 2019, p. 26). That is 
exactly what happens with social relations: for if some citizens obtain more 
status than others, it is reasonable to believe that the absolute value of the 
rest of inferiorly evaluated citizens’ status will diminish as well. Hence, Duress 
states that we should be sensitive to some inequalities for distributive suffi-
cientarian reasons, as they might have negative derived effects with respect of 
the absolute level of enjoyment of aspects that we have objective reasons to 
value (Ibid. p. 424).
Before going into how Duress responds to the challenge posed by Hospital, 
it is important to stress that this account is built around a thick concept of 
what is enough, that is, a notion of sufficiency that has both a descriptive and 
an evaluative component. This means that it explains when people have 
enough, but also why it is desirable that they do (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2017, 
p. 102). Axelsen and Nielsen’s is bounded to a notion of a perfectionist view of 
a flourishing life, entailing a positive evaluation of sufficiency that is indepen-
dent of people’s subjective points of view. Therefore, the framework gives 
intrinsic reasons to worry about the relational egalitarian concerns that I have 
already mentioned. I think that this is an attractive feature of the approach 
and, later, I will argue that a satisfactory variant of GSV should incorporate it. 
But let us go now to how it can respond to Hospital.
Duress internalizes social egalitarian concerns into the threshold, and 
hence accommodates ‘ . . . important values such as nondiscrimination, 
unfairness, and imprudence’ (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2017, p. 102) in their evalua-
tion of distributive outcomes. This gives us powerful sufficientarian reasons 
for objecting to Hospital. Firstly, Casal’s case is silent about the consequences 
in absolute terms that the distributive inequality produced by the donation 
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might have, due to its interweaving with positional aspects: for example, the 
highly unequal distribution of benefits could bring into existence inegalitar-
ian status norms that compromise the absolute ability of some to succeed in 
their social interests (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015, p. 423). Further, one could say 
that people should have the capacity to have influence over one’s social 
environment (Idem), and hence it would not be accurate to say that the 
patients have enough. Moreover, the way in which the donation takes 
place could have direct negative impacts on people’s absolute levels of status 
or self-respect, since the arbitrary decision of the administrators could be 
understood as a discriminatory action that sends a message to the non- 
beneficiaries as being less worthy, damaging their status in absolute terms 
(Axelsen & Nielsen, 2017, p. 114). In sum, Duress provides reasons for denying 
that Hospital does not entail any relevant deficiency. Furthermore, if it would 
really not entail any deficiencies, biting the bullet seems reasonable as the 
approach is sufficiently demanding regarding the values to which GSV is 
supposed to be blind to (Nielsen, 2019, p. 29).
However, I think that the internalizing strategy is, ultimately, inadequate. 
For it always needs to point to an outcome where a particular person or group 
does not have enough – i.e. under significant pressure against succeeding in 
a central aspect of human life –, whereas a setback in freedom for succeeding 
in this sense is not a necessary condition for injustice. In fact, relevant 
instances related to unrespectful treatment do not meet these criteria. For 
example, imagine that the administrators, while attempting to benefit their 
favourite group – say, ignoring whether others from the community would be 
interested in this collective decision, or admittedly considering this group to 
be of superior standing – nevertheless fail. Suppose that the helicopters that 
were going to deliver the luxuries to their favourite patients ran out of gas, 
and their morally tainted plan, and distributive outcome, simply did not 
materialize.2 In this context, what matters is the instantiation of a form 
disrespectful treatment that is objectionable for relational egalitarian reasons, 
regardless its distributive consequences. But the internalizing strategy fails to 
articulate these fundamental intuitions: conceptualizing interpersonal rela-
tions only in terms of how they affect individuals’ expectations cannot 
cover some fundamentally non-distributive dimensions of relations as such, 
namely, aspects that do not refer to the effects of how people treat each to 
other – such as the quality of attitudes and evaluations that are expressed by 
agents’ actions, which might express neglect, hostility, inferiority, and other 
objectionable attitudes of diminishment towards others (Schemmel, 2011a, 
p. 125, p. 128; Fourie, 2012, pp. 111–112; Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018, p. 6; 
Moles & Parr, 2019, p. 132). Moral agents are entitled to a kind of treatment 
that is independent of distributive consequences, a treatment that is denied 
in Hospital even though individuals are not under duress. This is something 
that the internalizing strategy cannot successfully explain.3
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The externalizing strategy
Let us now consider how an externalizing strategy would look like when 
applied to distributive sufficientarianism. Paraphrasing Axelsen and 
Bidadanure’s depiction of how distributive egalitarians externalize social 
egalitarian concerns, the sufficientarian version claims:
Justice can be defined as and reduced to distributive sufficiency. But other 
things different from having enough matter when determining how we ought 
to distribute in an all things considered sense, such as securing egalitarian social 
relations and fair treatment. (Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018, p. 3)
External-pluralist sufficiency views, such as Huseby’s two-level threshold con-
ception of sufficiency – according to which we should endorse a minimal thresh-
old of basic needs fulfilment and a maximal threshold of contentment, meaning 
‘ . . . not the absence of any desire to further improve one’s lot, but rather 
satisfaction with the overall quality of one’s life’ (Huseby, 2010, p. 181) –, are 
precisely in this line of justification. Whereas distributive justice is correctly 
interpreted by the claim that people should have enough, the strategy claims, 
there is still space to object to relational inequalities such as discrimination or 
disrespectful treatment on ‘deontic’ grounds (Ibid. p. 180). This means we should 
sometimes aim for equality for reasons that do not relate to the evaluation of 
outcomes, but rather in virtue of the way in which these outcomes came about 
(Parfit, 2006, pp. 464–465): put differently, ‘ . . . we do not only have to distribute 
properly, we also have to treat people properly while doing so’ (Schemmel, 
2011a, p. 141). If people are not treated with equal respect and concern while 
distributing, independently of the fact that they have enough, we still have 
normative reasons for opposing such scenarios (Huseby, 2010, p. 186). In fact, 
Huseby argues that when people are treated on arbitrary or irrelevant bases 
there is an objectionable violation of their human dignity which is compatible 
with the truth of distributive sufficientarianism (Ibid. p. 190). This might give us 
the non-distributive, relational egalitarian reasons for responding to Hospital that 
we are looking for: if we accept the intrinsic moral importance of the way social 
and political institutions act, and argue that they must do it on non-arbitrary 
bases (Schemmel, 2011a, pp. 125, p. 128), we have grounds for condemning 
distributions related to actions motivated by arbitrary reasons – e.g. actions that 
express normative attitudes that assign differential moral status to persons (Ibid. 
p. 134). And we can say this even if everyone has enough in the specified sense.
But the externalizing strategy is not satisfactory either. Fundamentally, it is not 
clear how distributive sufficientarian and relational egalitarian reasons relate to 
each other (Schemmel, 2011a, p. 129), leaving us without a clear guidance to 
adjudicate in situations in which these values are at odds (Meijers & Vandamme, 
2019, pp. 325–330). For example, in Huseby’s view, we could suppose that 
everyone in Hospital is content with the outcome, even though there is 
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a deontic wrong. But then, we could reasonably stipulate that repairing such 
a wrong might course the effect that the unfairly benefited group of individuals 
would cease to be content with their share of resources. In that state of affairs, we 
lack guidance for deciding whether to eliminate the unfairness or produce 
Husebyan insufficiency – that is, if we should opt for a state of affairs that treats 
people respectfully, or where everyone is content. Huseby would respond that 
the unfairly advantaged would not be acting reasonably if they would claim to be 
discontent (Huseby, 2010, p. 182). But that requires an objective, thick concept- 
based criterion for settling what constitutes having enough. Here, an option 
would be to go back to Duress, for it has an objective multiple-threshold that 
incorporates social relations as a distribuenda and rules out demands that fall 
outside the domain of central areas of human life. Doing that would allow us to 
say that the now discontent, previously unfairly advantaged, patients, have no 
claim for alleging reparation on the basis of justice. However, and sort of 
obviously, endorsing the externalizing strategy entails not including these 
dimensions in the threshold, meaning that this option is not open here. 
I conclude that the externalizing strategy also fails.
Toward a distributive sufficientarian/relational egalitarian hybrid 
conception
I have argued that neither the internalizing nor the externalizing strategies 
are satisfactory as they stand. The former cannot encompass important 
dimensions of relational injustices – such as the disrespectful attitudes 
expressed by institutions when acting –, and the latter leads to counter-
intuitive conclusions when excluding the objective value of egalitarian social 
relations from the threshold. Hence, if my different interpretations of Hospital 
have been correct, distributive sufficientarian theories of justice cannot fully 
cover relevant senses that BIO can take. But I think that a third alternative 
integrating features of both strategies is able to do this. Call it the Distributive 
Sufficientarian/Relational Egalitarian Hybrid (DRH):
DRH. Distributive justice demands giving everyone access to enough material 
and social conditions necessary for leading flourishing lives. However, some 
aspects of the relational phenomena cannot be reduced to distributive logics – 
such as the attitudes expressed by institutions while acting – which ground 
a justice-based demand that people should be always treated respectfully. The 
non-reducible relational aspects should be considered a different, and relevant 
part, of our conception of justice.
DRH is what Moles and Parr call a hybrid approach, based on the idea that 
distributive sufficientarianism and relational egalitarianism are non-mutually 
reducible positions that describe fundamental reasons, ‘ . . . which may some-
times conflict, but often are mutually supportive of each other’ (Moles & Parr, 
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2019, p. 133). Accordingly, the conjecture is that the truth of a certain theory 
of distributive sufficientarianism does not provide any intrinsic evidence 
against the truth of relational egalitarianism, and vice-versa. In other words, 
there is no contradiction in saying that justice requires both that people have 
access to sufficient freedoms for flourishing, in the same sense as Duress, and 
absence of disrespectful treatment – since it is inadequate to conceptualize 
certain dimensions of it solely in terms of its distributive effects. Hence, if the 
construction is sound, sufficientarians can maintain the reasons against 
Hospital developed in Section 2.1 while avoiding the cost of allowing unfair-
ness in contexts where anyone is under duress. Further, since DRH condemns 
disrespectful treatment independently of consequentialist reasons, the view 
can maintain the arguments of Section 2.2 and avoid the counterintuitive 
implications of completely ruling out social relations from our threshold. 
I think that all these features make DRH an attractive option for sympathizers 
of sufficientarianism who are troubled by BIO.
Before finishing, let me consider some further challenges that DRH will have to 
face in order to be convincing. One issue is related to its actually able to over-
come BIO in a satisfactory way. For, going back to Hospital, imagine that, instead 
of stipulating that administrators allocate resources on an arbitrary basis, they 
decide to do so through running a fair lottery giving equal chances to a number 
of patients to access the luxuries – call this variation Hospital Lottery. In this case, it 
might seem implausible to say that the outcome should be objected for the 
champion of DRH – since everyone have enough and seemed to be treated fairly. 
But some people might still want to hold that the great distributive inequality 
involved is objectionable. If the lottery, albeit through a fair procedure, granted 
enormous benefits to some patients which were denied to others, great inequal-
ities would arise that, to many, seem intuitively problematic. And, at first glance, it 
seems that DRH cannot capture the wrongness of these inequalities. It follows 
that that DRH would not overcome BIO.4
While it is not my intention to offer a comprehensive case against the force of 
Hospital Lottery, I will flesh out the theoretical resources that DRH could deploy in 
reply. Firstly, it is essential to note that, in purely distributive terms, the idea that 
parties have enough after the allocation of resources through the lottery is not 
necessarily true. Remember that DRH is fundamentally sensitive to the ways in 
which distributive inequality can positionally entail distributive insufficiency. If it is 
true that great economic inequalities, say, hinder the ability of agents to have 
access to the sufficient conditions for leading a flourishing life (e.g. unequal 
outcomes produce inegalitarian status norms that conflict with their fundamen-
tal interests of human beings in a social setting), then the unequal outcomes of 
Hospital Lottery can be objected. On the other hand, in relational terms, it is 
important to recognize that relational inequality can reasonably manifest itself in 
(at least) two ways. First, through the procedure by which goods are distributed – 
for example, if these are distributed on arbitrary bases. But it can also manifest 
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through the procedure by which the divisibility of goods is decided. In this second 
case, relational egalitarians might object to lotteries not as an unfair procedure 
for distributing goods as such, but because they think the goods that were up for 
distribution were bundled in an unfair way to begin with. Put differently, patients 
of Hospital Lottery might object to the initial distribution of power that allows 
someone – i.e. the administrators – to unilaterally decide to run lotteries dis-
tributing large amounts of socially valuable goods to a small number of agents 
(rather than, say, letting the decision procedure be democratically decided). 
These are the preliminary ways in which champions of DRH should (and, 
I think, will be able to) reply to hypotheticals such as Hospital Lottery.
Now, of course, a comprehensive refutation of this objection would require 
further elaboration, such as a more complete account of which procedures of 
allocation and distributive decision-making are incompatible with relational 
inequality, or which particular social conditions are necessary for leading 
a ‘flourishing life’. Indeed, similar to most hybrid conceptions of justice available 
in the literature (Moles & Parr, 2019, p. 144), DRH, as outlined here, is significantly 
underspecified. Not least because, as was the case with the externalizing strategy, 
DRH does not offer a principled method to resolve potential conflicts between 
securing that everyone is not under duress and condemning certain types of 
disrespectful treatment, lacking a clear weighting method between these differ-
ent components. My intuition is that the demandingness of a distributive theory 
of sufficiency such as Duress, combined with a relational concern with disrespect, 
makes it very difficult both to justify great economic inequalities such as those 
depicted in Hospital Lottery, as well as to imagine cases in which either we secure 
that everyone is not under duress, or we avoid relational wrongs – for example, 
because both consider egalitarian relationships as intrinsically valuable. This 
means that the absence of a weighting method should not be that disturbing, 
although fleshing out these issues in more detail is pressing in future work. Here, 
I simply tried to show the possibility of sensitizing distributive sufficiency to the 
values that many objectors do not see in the ideal. If I managed to achieve that, 
that will be, for so far, enough.
Notes
1. It is important to stress that sufficientarianism does not intrinsically rule out the 
importance of distributive equality or priority, and that distributive hybrids are 
possible – e.g. Liam Shield’s claim that there is a discontinuity in the importance 
of benefiting people once they have met the threshold (Shields, 2012, p. 108). 
I will leave aside distributive-hybrid versions in my analysis, however, because 
they are inconsistent with the GSV (Nielsen, 2019, p. 22).
2. I am grateful to David Axelsen for this example.
3. Axelsen and Nielsen have recently recognized that disrespectful treatment is 
a justice-based wrong ‘. . .independently of distributive outcomes. Moral agents, 
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[they claim], should not be treated with distrust or a lack of common courtesy 
[even if they “have enough”]’ (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2020, p. 6).
4. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making me conscious about this 
problem.
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